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I. INTRODUCTION

The Altmann family has tried for half a century to recover their valuable
paintings from the Austrian government.1 Their troubles began when Austria
was overthrown by Nazi Germany. 2 The Altmann family had two choices - flee
the country or be transported to Nazi concentration camps and an uncertain
future. The Altmanns chose to flee and had to leave almost everything they
owned behind, including their cherished and valuable works of art.' After a
change of Austrian law in their favor, and several failed attempts to work things
out with the Austrian National Museum, litigation finally commenced in 1999.4
Originally, Maria Altmann intended to file and proceed with this lawsuit in
Austria.5 However, due to the extraordinarily high court costs of approximately
$200,000, Ms. Altmann was forced to voluntarily dismiss her suit in Austria and
re-file the action in United States federal court.6 In response, Austria filed a
Motion to Dismiss, arguing various defenses including a claim of sovereign
*
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Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2244 (2004).

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002).

5.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2245.

6.

Id.
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immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).7 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California denied
Austria's Motion to Dismiss and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.8
Austria applied to the United States Supreme Court for review on the sole
issue of whether the FSIA applied to claims that were based on conduct
occurring before the passage of the Act.9 On June 7, 2004, the Court concluded
that the FSIA could be applied retroactively to claims that occurred before the
passage of the Act, and before the official adoption of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in 1976.0 While this ruling does not determine whether
Ms. Altmann will win her original lawsuit, it does grant her a small
victory-she may proceed with her suit against Austria and attempt to reclaim
the paintings her family once cherished."
The pending cases of Joo v. Japan and Nationale Des Chemins De Fer
Francaisv. Abrams share many similarities with Altmann. 2 In both cases,
which revolve around events occurring during WWII, the foreign sovereigns
claim immunity under the FSIA in order to escape any liability they may face
if forced to defend themselves in a lawsuit. 3 The United States Supreme Court
granted a review to both cases, Joo and Abrams. 4 However, in light of the
Altmann decision, the Court vacated the decisions of the lower courts and
remanded the cases back to their respective courts of appeals. 5 Part I of this
paper will provide a recitation of the facts of Austria v. Altmann. Part II will
discuss the background, history, and confusion surrounding whether the FSIA
will be retroactively applied. Part III will analyze the Altmann decision and
examine the reasoning of the Supreme Court, which held that the FSIA should
be applied retroactively. Part IV will apply the analysis of Altmann to the Joo
and Abrams cases, and will speculate as to how the courts of appeals will decide
these cases in light of Altmann.
7.

Id. at 2246.

8.
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Altmann, 317
F.3d at 974.
9.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.
Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan Minister Yohei Kono, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 2834 (U.S. Jun. 9, 2004); Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173
(2d Cir. 2003), cert.granted,Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v. Abrahams, 124 S. Ct. 2834-35
(U.S. June 14, 2004).
13.

Joo, 332 F.3d at 679; Abrams, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003).

14.

Id.

15.
Hwang Guem Joo v. Japan, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004), vacatedand remanded332 F.3d 679 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Abrahams, 124 S. Ct. at 2834-35 (2004).
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H. BACKGROUND: AUSTRIA V. ALTMANN
Maria Altmann, the plaintiff in this case, seeks to recover six paintings by
the famous Austrian artist Gustav Klimt which were owned by her family before
the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany. 6 These paintings are currently
housed in the Austrian National Gallery, which is owned and operated by the
Republic of Austria. 7 The painings, valued at several million dollars, were
once owned by and displayed in the home of Altmann's uncle, Ferdinand
Bloch-Bauer, a wealthy sugar baron.'" Bloch-Bauer's wife, Adele, was the
subject of two of the paintings.' 9 Mrs. Bloch-Bauer died in 1925, and in her
will, asker her husband to bequeath the paintings to the Austrian National
Gallery after his death. 2' Bloch-Bauer, who was the legal owner of the paintings, never executed any documents transferring ownership to the Gallery. 2' His
will bequeathed his estate in its entirety to Ms. Altmann and two other family
members.22
In 1938 the Nazis invaded and annexed Austria. Ferdinand, a Jew, was
forced to flee the country and leave everything behind. 24 The Nazis took over
his home in Vienna and divided up his artwork, which included several other
valuable paintings and a large porcelain collection. 2' The Nazi lawyer in charge
of liquidating Mr. Bloch-Bauer's estate "donated" two of the paintings to the
Gallery in exchange for another painting." The "donation" included a note
claiming to deliver the paintings as per the request in Adele Bloch-Bauer's
will.27 The note was signed "Heil Hitler. ' 28 Two of the other Klimt paintings

were sold to museums, one to the Austrian National Museum and one to the
Museum of the City of Vienna. 9 The fifth painting was sold to a third party,

16.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2245.

17.

Michael D. Murray, Stolen Art and Sovereign Immunity: The Case ofAltmann v. Austria, 27

COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 301, 303 (2004).

18.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2243.

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 2243-44.

21.

Id. at 2244.

22.

Id.

23.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2244.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Murray, supra note 17, at 304.

27.

Altmann, 124 S Ct. at 2245.

28.

Id.

29.

Murray, supra note 17, at 304.
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who later donated it to the Gallery.3" The fate of the sixth painting is not
known."
In 1946, Austria passed a law declaring all transactions motivated by Nazi
ideology to be null and void. 2 The artwork, however, was not automatically
returned to the rightful owners.33 Austrian law required anyone wishing to
export seized art to gain permission from the Austrian Federal Monument
Agency.34 The agency usually required the original owners of the art to re-pay
the purchase price to the government or to trade other artworks in exchange for
the seized property.35 In response to this new law, Ms. Altmann's brother hired
an Austrian lawyer to recover the artwork stolen from their uncle by the Nazis.36
In 1948, the attorney contacted the gallery, requesting the paintings be
returned.37 The Gallery stated that the paintings were donated in accordance
with the will of Adele Bloch-Bauer and would not be returned.3"
Recently, Austria passed a new law under which individuals who had been
forced to donate art in exchange for export permits could reclaim their
"donated" art." This new law prompted Ms. Altmann to initiate a lawsuit
against the government in Austria.4" Unlike the United States court system,
court costs in Austria are proportional to the value of the damages or property
sought.4' In this case, the artwork is worth several million dollars, and for the
suit to proceed in Austria, Ms. Altmann would have been required to pay
approximately $200,000.42 Unable to pay this amount, Ms. Altmann voluntarily
dismissed her suit and re-filed it in the United States District Court for the

30.

Id.

31.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2244.

32.

Id.

33.
Id. The Austrian Republic required the original owners of the property to re-pay the purchaser
of the property, seized and sold to them by the Nazis, the purchase price before the property was returned to
the original, rightful owner. Id
34.

Id.

35.

Id.; Murray, supra note 17, at 304.

36.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2244.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.
Id.at 2245. The law provides restitution to those whose artwork had been donated to the gallery
in exchange for export permits to transport other works of art from the country. Id.
40.

Id.

41.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2245. Austrian filing fees are determined by the amount in controversy.

42.

Id.

Id.
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Central District of California.4 3 As previously stated, Austria moved to dismiss,
claiming foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 4
III. FSIA
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 codified the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity that was established in 1952. 45 By enacting the
FSIA, Congress intended to clarify the circumstances in which federal courts
would have jurisdiction over foreign nations and transfer immunity decisionmaking to the judiciary.4 6 The responsibility of sovereign immunity decisionmaking had previously rested with the executive branch.47 The United States
Congress determined that because of the long, convoluted history of foreign
sovereign immunity, a statute was necessary to determine exactly which entity
had the power to decide the immunity of a country.4"
It is generally accepted that the concept of foreign sovereign immunity
originated from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon.49 In that case, the Chief Justice understood the concept of foreign
sovereign immunity to be a jurisdictional issue, not one of substantive law.50
Marshall reasoned that foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of comity, and
one in which the executive branch is best suited to make decisions.5' In accord
with that opinion, the Supreme Court generally deferred to the decisions of the
executive branch.52 Foreign states who were sued in the United States usually
requested sovereign immunity from the executive branch, and in most cases it
was granted.53 This all changed in 1952, with the Tate Letter.54
Before 1952, the United States adhered to the theory of absolute sovereign
immunity, and the executive branch requested immunity in actions against
43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 2246.

45.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2004); Alfred Dunham of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 71115(1976) (citing Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952)).
46.

See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 6605 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.

47.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2247.

48.

See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.

49.

See, e.g., Murray, supra note 17, at 306; Altmann, S. Ct. at 2247.

50.

The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).

51.

Id. at 137.

52.
See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943); Rep. of Mex. v. Hofman, 324 U.S. 30, 33-36 (1945).
53.

Verlinden B. V, 461 U.S. at 486.

54.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CH. 5, pt. IV,

introductory note (1987);Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248.
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foreign sovereigns who were "friends" of the United States." Under this theory,
a sovereign could not be sued in the courts of another country without its
permission.16 However, in 1952, the State Department determined that
immunity should no longer be granted in all cases.57 In what is now known as
the "Tate Letter," Jack Tate, the Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State,
announced to the Attorney General that the State Department would now apply
the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity. 58 Under the restrictive theory,
the sovereign is immune from claims arising from governmental activity, but
not from activities stemming from commercial activities conducted by the
state.5 9
This policy change had little impact on the procedures used by sovereigns
who wanted to be granted immunity; the foreign state still asked the executive
branch for immunity. 60 However, problems now arose from the executive
branch attempting to grant immunity to a sovereign under the new restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity. 6' The executive branch attempted to confer
sovereign immunity on countries that now had no right to it under the newly
adopted restrictive theory.62 In addition, if a sovereign did not request immunity
through the executive branch, the responsibility of resolving the question of
immunity was left to the courts to determine. 63 Thus, decisions of whether to
grant foreign sovereign immunity were made by two different branches of
government, yielding non-uniform decisions.'
Congress attempted to rectify these problems by passing the FSIA.65
Generally, the Act grants immunity to foreign states. However, a certain
number of exceptions, including an commercial activity exception, may subject
foreign countries to lawsuits in the United States 66 Generally, the commercial
activity exception disallows the granting of sovereign immunity to countries that
engage in commercial business transaction within the United States.67 The
Supreme Court recognized that the FSIA removed existing federal jurisdiction
55.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248.

56.

Id.

57.

AlfredDunham of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 711.

58.

Id.

59.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS § 451 (1987).

60.

Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 487.

61.

Id. at 487-88.

62.

Id. at 487.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 488.

65.

Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 488.

66.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2004).

67.

Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
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over foreign sovereigns from a number of statutes and placed federal jurisdiction exclusively in the FSIA.68 The statute simply reallocated jurisdictional
granting authority. 69 The statute did not create jurisdiction where none existed
previously." This all seems pretty clear, and courts have not had problems with
this proposition. 7 Courts have had problems, however, determining when to
apply the statute to certain cases.72
Confusion over which cases the FSIA is to be applied to stems from the
vague language of the statute.73 Section 1602, the preamble of the FSIA, states
"claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts
of the United States... in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter., 74 Courts have interpreted the use of the word "henceforth" in many
different ways.75 Unfortunately, the House Report on the FSIA provides no
clarity for the courts.76
In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the use of the word
"henceforth" to mean that the FSIA should apply to all cases after its enactment,
regardless of when the cause of action accrued. 7 In addition, that court found
that application of the FSIA to the case would only effect a change of
jurisdiction, not a change of substantive law, and applying it retroactively would
not prejudice either of the parties. 78 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in its decision of Altmann agreed with the Princz court, and further stated that
Austria could not have had any expectation that foreign sovereign immunity
would have been extended to it for the wrongful appropriation of Jewish
property.79 In fact, the United States government made it clear in 1949 that it
would not condone any transactions in which property was wrongly

68.

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 428-38 (1989).

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997); Verlinden B. V 461

U.S. at 493-94.
72.
See, e.g., Princz v. Federal Republic ofGermany, 26 F.3d 1166,1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994);Altmann,
317 F.3d at 963; Joo, 332 F.3d at 687; Abrams, 332 F.3d at 185.
73.

Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.

74.

28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2004).

75.

See, e.g., Princz,26 F.3d at 1170;Altmann, 317 F.3d at 963;Joo,332 F.3dat 686;Abrams,332

F.3d at 185.
76.

See generally H.R. REP.No. 94-1487 at (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.

77.

Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.

78.

Id.

79.

Altmann, 317 F.3d at 965.
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appropriated by the Nazis.8" It is well settled that the FSIA does not infringe on
any substantive rights held by a country at the time an act occurred; it only
affects the jurisdiction of the country when pertaining to its commercial
activities."
The District of Columbia circuit and the second circuit in per curium
opinions did not interpret the use of the word "henceforth" in the same
manner.82 These courts concluded that the word "henceforth" can support
several different meanings, and that Congress did not clearly express how to
apply the statute with respect to events occurring before the statute was passed.83
With that in mind, these courts have decided to apply a plain language
interpretation to the word, and simply apply the FSIA only to events occurring
after its enactment.84 Past decisions notwithstanding, it is clear that courts did
not agree on how the FSIA should be applied and were in need of some type of
direction from the Supreme Court. This direction fimally came in June of 2004
with the announcement of the ruling in Republic of Austria v. Altmann.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AUSTRIA V. ALTMANN
On June 7, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in the case of
Republic of Austria v. Altmann." The Court considered whether the FSIA
applied to claims that were based on conduct occurring before the passage of the
Act. 86 The Court concluded that the FSIA does apply retroactively to claims
occurring before the passage of the Act, and before the official adoption of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 1976.87 The Altmann case was
granted review after the ninth circuit denied Austria's Motion to Dismiss.88
Austria raised an argument of foreign sovereign immunity in two ways. First,
it argued that as of 1948, when the alleged events occurred, Austria would have
been protected by absolute immunity.89 Second, it contended that the FSIA
cannot be applied retroactively, thereby maintaining its privilege of absolute
80.
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to the attorneys for the
plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31-555 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Apr. 27,
1949) Jack Tate, Letter from the Acting Legal Advisor to the Attorney General, reprinted in 26 Dep't St. Bull.
984 (1952).
81.

See, e.g., Murray, supranote 17, at 304; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 966; Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2246.

82.

Joo, 332 F.3d at 686; Abrams, 332 F.3d at 184.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2256.

86.

Id. at 2243.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 2246.

89.

Id.

Adelman

2004]

immunity.90 Specifically, Austria argued that it enjoyed the privilege of
absolute immunity in 1948, and that retroactive application of the FSIA would
strip it of this privilege, which would be impermissible. 9' Both the district court
and the court of appeals ruled that applying the FSIA retroactively to Austria's
alleged wrongdoing in 1948 was not impermissive because the United States
had made it well known to all nations that it would not condone any transactions
in which property was wrongly appropriated by the Nazis. 92
The Court first clarified an assumption of the district court concerning
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, a case on which the district court relied
heavily. 93 The default rule announced in Landgrafis as follows: if Congress
has made no clear expression of its intent, a court must then determine if
applying the statute retroactively would affect substantive or procedural rights.94
If the statute affects either of these rights, it may not be applied retroactively.95
However, when the Landgrafrule had been applied in the past, it did not yield
a uniform result. 96 Due to the nature ofjurisdictional granting statutes, they can
be viewed as both substantive and procedural law. 97 As a result, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested that the decision of retroactive
application be made on a case-by-case basis. 9
In Landgraf the Court considered whether Section 102 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 applied to an employment discrimination case that was pending on
appeal at the time the new law was passed: the law in effect at the time the
decision was rendered, or the law in effect at the time the incident occurred. 99
The Court recognized that "retroactivity is not favored in the law," and that
"congressional enactments ...
will not be construed to have retroactive effect
The presumption against
unless their language requires this result."'"
retroactive application stems from considerations of fairness replete in
American law, that individuals should be able to know what the law is in order

90.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2246.

91.

Id.

92.

Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1199;Altmann, 317 F.3d at 965.

93.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2246.

94.

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).

95.

Id.

96.
Yonatan Lupu & Clay Risen, Retroactive Application of the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act:
LandgrafAnalysis and the PoliticalQuestionDoctrine,8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 251 (2003).
97.

Lupu, supra note 96 at 250.

98.

Abrams, 332 F.3d at 186; Lupu, supra at 252.

99.

Landgraf 511 U.S. at 264.

100.

Id.

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

182

[Vol. 11:173

its
to conduct themselves accordingly.11 Generally, if Congress has not made
2
retroactively.°
legislation
apply
to
declined
have
courts
clear,
intention
The Court recognized that retroactive application was extremely important
to statutes concerning substantive law, or rights that an individual or entity has,
13
but that it was not as important in statutes concerning jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional statutes merely change the court that is to hear the case, and do
not seek to change the substantive law on which the case will be decided."°
Thus, arguably to apply a statute of this type retroactively would neither grant
05
nor take away any substantive rights because it affects jurisdiction only.
However, the Supreme Court determined that the FSIA is not capable of
categorization; it is an amalgamation of both procedural and substantive law.0 6
Next, the Court examined the specific language of the FSIA.' °7 The Court
found it patently clear from the preamble of the Act that the FSIA would apply
In doing so, it found convincing
to all post-enactment claims of immunity.'
evidence that Congress intended the Act to apply to pre-enactment conduct.10 9
The Court examined the language surrounding the word "henceforth."" 0
Specifically, the Act states "claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in
conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.""' The Court examined
the Congressional intent and determined that the purpose of the word
"henceforth" is for the statute to apply to all claims of immunity arising after the
Act was passed." 2 Therefore, all claims of immunity should be decided in
accordance with the FSIA regardless of when the events occurred.
Lastly, the Court looked at the congressional purpose behind the passage
of the FSIA. Congress sought to accomplish two main goals by enacting the
FSIA: to clarify the rules judges apply when dealing with claims of sovereign
immunity and to clarify separations of powers between the judiciary and
executive with respect to these claims, by affirmatively conferring this power
101. I.N.S v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,316 (2001) (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo,
494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
102.

LNS, 533 U.S. at 325.

103.

Landgraf 511 U.S. at 274.

104.

Id. at 275.

105.

Id. at 274.

106.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2257.

107.

Id. at 2252.

108.

Id.

109.

Id. at 2253.

110.

Id.

111.

28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2004).

112.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at2253.
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on the judiciary." 3 To accomplish these goals, Congress crafted a statutory
framework around the concept of foreign sovereign immunity.114 Rebutting an
argument that the FSIA should not be applied to claims that pre-date its
enactment, the Court stated that if this were allowed, the entire jurisdictional
scheme of the statute would be frustrated.' Moreover, the Court determined
that applying the FSIA to all pending cases, regardless of when the events
occurred, is most consistent with the Act's two main purposes.' 16
The structure of the FSIA supports this conclusion." 7 Many provisions of
the Act apply to events occurring before its passage.' 18 There has never been
any doubt that the Act's procedural provisions relating to venue, service, or
removal apply to all cases, irrespective of when the event occurred. 119 The
Court held that the FSIA should apply at the time the suit is brought, not the law
in effect at the time the events originally occurred. 2 ° Based on this, the Court
reasoned that it would be "anomalous" to assume that the FSIA should only be
applied in a prospective manner with regard to jurisdiction.12 1
Consequently, the decisions of the district court and the court of appeals
were affirmed.' 22 However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
executive branch was still free to file amicus briefs, asking for a country to be
granted immunity.'23 This acknowledgement seems to suggest an alternate
course of action for foreign sovereigns desiring immunity. Finally, the Court
cautioned that this holding was extremely narrow, only answering only the
question of whether the FSIA could be applied retroactively.'24 The Supreme
Court refused to address any of the other issues brought up in the opinions of
the lower courts.'25 Although the holding may be narrow, the consequences of
this case may have a profound effect on two other cases pending before the
Court.

113.

See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.

114.

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at2253.

115.

Id.

116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119.

Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 497.

120.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at2253.

121.

Id.

122.

Id. at 2256.

123.

Id. at 2255.

124.

Id.at2254.

125.

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2254.
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V. JOO AND ABRAMS: RAMIFICATIONS OF ALTMANN

This year, the United States Supreme Court granted review to two cases
where, like Altmann, foreign sovereigns rely on the FSIA in their Motions to
Dismiss. 126 Both sovereigns, Japan and France, raise the FSIA as a defense to
jurisdiction by arguing that the underlying events in their respective cases
occurred before the Act was passed, and thus, the FSIA cannot be applied to
them. 127 However, instead of hearing oral arguments from all parties, the Court
vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the cases back to their
respective courts of appeals in light of the Altmann decision.' 28 The following
two sections will apply the analysis employed by the Supreme Court in
Altmann, and will proffer an opinion as to how the courts of appeal will
eventually decide these two cases.
A. Joo v. Japan
Fifteen former Japanese "comfort women," have brought suit against Japan
seeking monetary damages for being victimized through sexual slavery and
torture by members of the Japanese Army during World War H. 129 The women
allege the government of Japan abducted and forced them to serve as "comfort
women" i.e. sex slaves, for the Japanese Army near the front lines of the war. 3 °
The women, who were not citizens of the United States, were able to file suit
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows foreign citizens to bring
claims against each other in American courts.' 31 Since 1991, comfort women
from several countries have attempted to seek redress in Japanese courts; all
have been unsuccessful. 3 2 The unfortunate legal situation in Japan may be
attributed to the fact that, unlike Germany or Austria, Japan has yet to pass
legislation requiring the government to compensate victims from its wars.' 33 In
addition, it may be difficult to render an impartial verdict in the courts of Japan
because women filing lawsuits of this type have been met with numerous
technical barriers as well as hostility from the courts.' Presumably, comfort
126.
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women have been met with this response because the lawsuits are not supported
by concurring legislation or executive orders.1 35 These factors have rendered the
Japanese courts virtually impenetrable to the claims of comfort women, and
therefore, the group filed suit in the United States. 36
In 2000, the women filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. 37 Japan raised a defense of sovereign immunity
under FSIA in its Motion to Dismiss, and the motion was granted.138 The
district court failed to reach a conclusion on the issue of whether the FSIA
applies retroactively to events occurring before its enactment. 13 9 That court did,
however, conclude that the case presented a non-justiciable political question,
inappropriate for judicial review."4
The women appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit where the decision of the lower court was affirmed. 141 That
court held that the FSIA did not apply to events occurring before the Act's
passage. 42 The court of appeals recognized that the FSIA provides the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court.'43 However,
the court declined to apply the statute retroactively because it would "upset the
settled expectations of foreign sovereigns."' 44 This proposition stems from the
fact that, in the 1940s, when these events occurred, 4the
Unites States operated
5
under the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.1
In Altmann, the Supreme Court addressed these concerns directly by
stating that the main purpose behind the concept of foreign sovereign immunity
has not been to help foreign countries shape their action in reliance of immunity,
but to allow countries to avoid the inconvenience of a lawsuit in another country
as a matter of comity. 1"6 Japan's argument that its expectations of immunity
would be frustrated if the FSIA were applied retroactively must fail. Japan or
any other country for that matter, engaging in behavior of this type should not
be granted a protection of immunity simply because the country thought at the
time it was immune from lawsuits.
135. Park, supra note 134, at 409.
136. Park, supra note 134, at 413.
137.
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Notably, the court of appeals in Joo argued that it can be distinguished
from Altmann because of the existence of the Treaty of Peace, signed by Japan
and the Allied Powers in 195 1.147 The Treaty waives "all claims of the Allied
Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its
nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war."' 4 8 The Treaty explains
that any war-related claims would be resolved through inter-governmental
agreements. 4 9 The court of appeals reasoned that it was because of this treaty
that jurisdiction could not be exercised over Japan.1 51 In Austria there was no
similar treaty.15' The court reasoned that in the absence of any specific direction
from Congress as to how the FSIA should be applied, it should
interpret the
52
retroactively.1
it
apply
not
and
meaning,
plain
its
statute using
However, foreign sovereign immunity could be denied sovereign immunity
under the FSIA for two reasons. 153 First, Japan may have explicitly waived
immunity when it accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration concerning
war crimes committed during World War B."4 Second, Japan may have
executed an implied waiver of sovereign immunity when it violatedjus cogens
norms by violating the human rights of its citizens. 55 The FSIA states that a
foreign sovereign shall not be entitled to immunity if it has explicitly waived its
sovereign immunity.'56 Japan may have done so when it accepted the terms of
the Potsdam
Declaration, acknowledging that it would be subject to war crime
57
litigation.1
Nonetheless, implicit waiver could be found in the second instance, where
a violation of a jus cogens norm has occurred. Jus cogens norms, which
developed out of the customs and common law of civilized nations, are so
fundamental to basic human rights that they cannot be affected by treaty or
otherwise. 158 Generally, jus cogens norms have included rules prohibiting
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genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid, and other extreme violations of
human rights.'5 9 These norms prevail over all agreements and invalidate rules
of international law in conflict with them. 60 Therefore, if Japan is found to
have violated ajus cogens norm, its sovereign immunity should be stripped, and
it should be made to answer for its actions. However, one of the main problems
for the comfort women in Joo is that most human rights claims have not been
brought against foreign sovereigns, but individuals.' 61 Courts in the United
States have not yet allowed an exception to immunity under the FSIA for ajus
cogens violation. 62 If citizens of a foreign country are allowed to sue their
resident country in American courts, the fear is that the United States may
interfere too deeply into foreign relations, and courts will venture outside the63
boundaries of the judiciary and interfere with the powers of another branch.1
In spite of this, the courts of the United States should consider an exception to
their past decisions maintaining sovereign immunity over countries that have
engaged in civil rights abuses.
There have been examples of waiving immunity as a result of ajus cogens
norm violation in other countries. In Prefecture of Voiotia v. FederalRepublic
of Germany, a Greek court disallowed Germany to retain sovereign immunity
because it found the country had violated a jus cogens norm. 6" The court
determined that the actions of the Nazis were an "abuse of sovereign power,"
65 United
on which Germany was not entitled to raise an immunity defense.'
States courts have not ruled in conformity with this idea, but that they have
addressed the issue in dicta. In the Princz decision, Judge Wald, in her dissent,
advocated the disallowance of sovereign immunity where ajus cogens violation
was found. 66 Thus, the violation of ajus cogens norm provides an alternate
means of disallowing sovereign immunity in this case. On remand, the court of
appeal should follow Judge Wald's urging and carve out an exception, since this
group of individuals would not be able to receive a fair and impartial verdict in
their own country.
Ultimately, since courts have determined that the FSIA does not affect the
substantive rights of a country, there seems to be no reason why the statute
159.
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could not be applied retroactively in this case.'67 A country should not be able
to determine the type of activities it engages in based on an expectation of
immunity; that would be an unethical use of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Nevertheless, it appears that is the situation the court is presented with here.
Japan should not have condoned this activity of its military knowing it was in
violation of its own laws, or even international law. This country should be
made to answer for the human rights abuses committed by its own soldiers. In
light of this, the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit should
deny the Motion to Dismiss. However, this case is distinguishable from
Altmann. There was no treaty to consider in Altmann, and here there is. The
Treaty of Peace effectively gives Japan immunity from suit in a legal forum. As
the Treaty of Peace is in place, the court will have to weigh the policy
considerations of conferring immunity on Japan and determine the best course
of action of all involved parties. If not for the Treaty, the court of appeals
would reverse the district court, allow the suit to go through, and rule in
accordance with Altmann.
B. Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais
The Abrams case is a class action against the French National Railroad
Company (FNRC) for the alleged deportation of Jews and others from France
to Nazi death camps during World War II.168 The twelve plaintiffs allege that
when the FNRC transported these individuals to the Nazi camps, it committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law.16 9 The FNRC
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, maintaining that it had
sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 17 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted the FNRCs Motion to Dismiss.' 7 ' The
district court concluded that the claim did not fall within any of the FSIA
17
exceptions, and thus was not subject to jurisdiction in a United States court. 1
In dicta, the court stated that the FSIA applies to all legal action initiated
after
73
its enactment, regardless of when the underlying events occurred. 1
In the appeal at the circuit court level, the appellees (plaintiffs) argued that
the FSIA shouldnot be applied retroactively, because it would affect the rights
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of the FNRC at the time the underlying events occurred, and render the
appellees powerless to pursue the claim (emphasis added).'7 4 The appellees
believe that questions of jurisdiction and immunity should be answered based
on the law in effect at the time the events occurred, the 1940s.1 75 In the 1940s,
the FNRC would not have been entitled to foreign sovereign immunity because
it was privately owned. 76 Now, the railroad is owned and operated by the
French government, thus raising sovereign immunity as a defense to jurisdiction
in United States courts.1 77 The circuit court wrestled with the question of
whether the FSIA can be applied to this case even though the events that
precipitated it occurred before the act was passed.1 78 The court agreed with the
how the statute should
appellees that there is no clear legislative intent directing
179
events.
the
of
timing
the
to
be applied with respect
The court applied the Landgrafanalysis.8 ' It determined that there was no
clear guidance as to whether the statute should be applied retroactively."' The
court then considered whether applying the FSIA would upset settled
expectations, change, or take away certain vested rights.'82 The court
determined that if a new statute is phrased in jurisdictional terms, but also
deprives a plaintiff of a claim, applying it retroactively is impermissible.' 83 The
court encounters the same situation in this case. If applied to the case today, the
FSIA would bar suit against the FNRC because it is now controlled by the
French government which is entitled to sovereign immunity.' 84 Although it is
recognized that the FSIA does not infringe on any substantive rights held by a
country at the time an act occurred, if applied in this case, the FSIA will infringe
on the rights of the plaintiffs to bring suit. 8' Therefore, if applied retroactively
in Abrams, the FSIA would extinguish the claim altogether.
In Altmann, the Supreme Court recognized that retroactivity is not favored
in the law, but that retroactive application was permissible for jurisdictionconferring statutes."' The Court determined that if a statute only affects
174.
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procedure, it may be applied retroactively.1 87 In this case, however, retroactive
application of the statute will not just affect procedure, it will deny the claim
altogether. 8 8 In light of this, the court of appeals should reverse the decision of
the district court and allow the suit to proceed. If the court issues this ruling, it
will not affect the sovereign immunity of France. France will still retain
sovereign immunity, but it will be subject to litigation from the actions of the
railroad under its private ownership. The court, however, may elect to employ
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and refuse to hear the case. 89
This doctrine gives a court the discretion to dismiss a suit otherwise
properly before it.' 90 The first step in any forum non conveniens analysis,
before a court considers the public and private factors, is to determine whether
a suitable alternate forum exists to hear the dispute in another country. 19' If no
suitable alternative exists, then the analysis should end there and the court
should proceed with its adjudication. 192 The court must then balance public and
private interests to determine whether it is in the best interest of all involved
parties to move the case to another forum.' 93 Private considerations include
"relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses... and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive."' 94 Public factors to consider include judicial
economy, conflict of laws, or the application of foreign law.' 95 However, the
Supreme Court in PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, stated that the plaintiff's initial
choice of forum deserves substantial weight and defendants should not be
allowed to engage in reverse forum shopping through the employ of forum non
conveniens. 96 What is most important to consider in this case is that if personal
jurisdiction may be exercised over the defendant, France, it should be. Since the
claim stems from atrocities of the Holocaust, the courts of the United States
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should not shrink from this opportunity to force countries participating in these
events to answer for their crimes.
Abrams should be distinguished from Altmann. The Abrams case is
couched in a manner that explains the consequences for the plaintiff. Altmann
speaks to the harm that may or may not befall the defendant. The ruling of the
court of appeals will affect whether this group of individuals, whose family
members were transported to Nazi concentration camps by the French railroad
company in the 1940s, will be able to seek legal relief for their injuries. By
allowing an exception to retroactive application of the FSIA, and allowing this
class action to proceed, the court of appeals will act in compliance with the
Altmann decision. More importantly, the court of appeals must not forget that
this case arose from events occurring during the Holocaust, and in the interest
of public policy, the claims of the group must be addressed.'9 7 However, if the
court does not carve out an exception, and simply applies the statute retroactively, without regard to the underlying facts, the claim will be extinguished
altogether, and the parties who initiated the suit will never see justice done.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although the legal system strives for equality and justice, it is hard to
please everyone, and many times, justice may not necessarily prevail. Even if
the ultimate goal of the courts is to avoid unfair prejudice to a party, it is
inevitable that one party will leave the courtroom unhappy. Suits involving
sovereign immunity are no exception. The concept of sovereign immunity
developed from a sense of comity between nations. Foreign nations,
recognizing that the cost of defending a lawsuit in a foreign country and
possible resulting damages could have dire economic consequences, came to an
understanding that they must protect themselves via sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity additionally preserves the concept of non-intervention in
international affairs. 198 The Altmann decision, which addresses these concepts,
has the potential for far reaching effects for victims of repressive regimes
throughout the world, and the effect that Altmann has over other cases has only
just begun with the two cases discussed here.
In Altmann, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of retroactive
application of the FSIA. Recognizing that sovereign immunity should not help
foreign countries shape their actions in reliance of immunity, but allow them to
avoid the inconvenience of a lawsuit in another country, the Court allowed
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retroactive application of the FSIA.'99 Japan argued in Joo that the FSIA should
not apply retroactively, because this type of application would upset settled
expectations of immunity. Japan's argument must fail because it directly
opposes the purpose of sovereign immunity, allowing countries to avoid lawsuits as a matter of convenience, not helping to shape their actions in reliance
of it. Therefore, Japan, or any other country for that matter, engaging in
behavior of this type should not be granted a protection of immunity simply
because the country thought at the time it was immune from lawsuits. The
plaintiffs in Joo will have a strong argument by contending that a violation of
jus cogens norms waives any shield of immunity. United States courts have
been reluctant to rule in this manner in the past, and the argument will probably
prove unsuccessful. 2°° However, as the Treaty of Peace is in place, Japan is
immune from lawsuits, and the court of appeals will have no choice but to grant
Japan's Motion to Dismiss.
Recognizing that retroactivity is not favored in the law, the Supreme Court
supports retroactive application for jurisdiction-conferring statutes.2 0' The
Abrams decision shows that a United States citizen who brings suit against a
foreign sovereign could be prejudiced unfairly. In this case, retroactive application of the statute affects procedure, but extinguishes a claim simultaneously.
That an entire country could be allowed immunity from a lawsuit for actions
that should have never occurred in the first place does not correlate.
To allow countries to retain sovereign immunity because of possibly
upsetting their settled expectations of immunity is a questionable practice.
Granting immunity based on this idea would allow countries to act however
they wish, without limits, and may even encourage illegal or immoral behavior.
Behavior of this type should never be condoned by the United States. This is
not to say that the United States should attempt to right every wrong in the
world. The concept of sovereign immunity also touches on the doctrine of nonintervention, that each country has a realm of authority unto its own.2 ° 2 When
countries begin to venture outside of their realm into that of another, problems
arise.2"3 The Vietnam War or the War in Iraq stand as modem day examples of
this. Certainly, there are some instances in which the United States could use
its power in the judiciary to address concerns from foreign citizens, and not
delve too deeply into foreign affairs. The three cases discussed here are
illustrative of the limited circumstances in which the United States should step
199.

Dole FoodCo., 538 U.S. at 479.

200.
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in and take action. Human rights abuses are a violation ofjus cogens norms.
By allowing this type of behavior to escape legal consequences, the United
States is implicitly condoning it. Accordingly, the courts of the United States
should apply the FSIA in a retroactive fashion, as in Altmann, and address the
abuses committed by these countries. In doing so, courts will adhere to the
basic principles of Altmann, and still allow parties that bring suit to have a fair
chance at justice.

